En este ar tícu lo con tien do la te sis de fen di da por Mi chael Giu di ce en la cual sos tie ne que es po si ble ela bo rar un con cep to de de re cho me dian te la de ter mi na ción de las pro pie da des ne ce sa rias de su esen cia. Mis te sis prin ci pa les son: 1) que sólo para cier to tipo de con cep tos pue de al canzar se ese ob je ti vo y 2) que el con cep to de "De re cho" no es uno de ellos. De fien do un plu ra lis mo me to do ló gi co con tra el mo nis mo me to do ló gi co sus cri to por al gu nos fi ló so fos del de re cho con tem po rá neos.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let me be gin with a brief ref er ence to the his tory of phi los ophy. Back in the 7th cen tury B.C., when my thol ogy was the one and only way of ex plain ing nat u ral phe nom ena, the Greek phi los o pher Thales of Miletus ap proached na ture in a quite new fash ion. While oth ers ap pealed to Gods for account ing nat u ral phe nom ena, Thales ex posed his ge om e try through con cepts like:
«If A, B and C are points on a cir cle where the line AC is a di am e ter of the cir cle, then the an gle ABC is a right an gle».
Or:
«A tri an gle is a three-sided poly gon whose in te rior an gles add up to 180°». 1
These geo met ric con cepts are very use ful to the pur pose of this com ment, for they sat isfy what I pro pose to de note with the ex pres sion "The golden stan dard of con cepts with nec es sary con di tions". The fea tures of this stan dard are: 1) Con cep tual mo nism: there is no room for al ter na tive con cepts to the same ob ject. Al though it might be pos si ble to de fine a tri an gle with other words, the con cept would finally be the same.
2) Invariantism: the con cept is free from con text de pendence, or, in other words, it does n't change in dif fer ent contexts or times 41 THE GOLDEN STANDARD OF CONCEPTS 3) Exhaustibility: the con cept in cludes all in stances of the same kind with out ex cep tions. All types of tri an gles are in cluded in the def i ni tion. 4) Indefeasiblility: the con cept can not be de feated by coun ter-ex am ples.
5) a pri ori-ness: the con cept is not a re sult of so cial agreement or em pir i cal data.
A dif fer ent and more philo soph i cal way for char ac ter iz ing a con cept that sat is fies the golden stan dard is the fol low ing -us ing the lan guage of pos si ble worlds-:
A prop erty P or set of prop er ties P-s is (are) an es sen tial prop erty of an ob ject O, if and only if, in all pos si ble worlds O has P.
Or, through an ex is tence-con di tioned modal char ac ter iza tion:
A P or set of P-s is or are es sen tial prop er ties of an ob ject O, if and only if, it is nec es sary that O has P if O ex ists.
As we have seen, there is at least one kind of ob ject that sat is fies the golden stan dard: geo met ric con cepts. How ever, this does n't im ply that for ev ery x, if x is a con cept, then x sat is fies the golden stan dard. For the con trary, I as sume the ex is tence of at least one pos si ble x which is a con cept and does n't sat isfy the golden stan dard. Thus, the philosoph i cal task of an a lyz ing con cepts will be suc cess ful as long as we are con cerned with the kind of con cepts that sat is fies the golden stan dard (CSGS).
II. PSEUDO-PROBLEMS
By the term 'pseudo-prob lem' let me stip u late the fol lowing mean ing: It is an ap par ent prob lem which is not re ally a prob lem, for the way in which it is ex posed war rants the im pos si bil ity of its so lu tion: for in stance, when some body is asked to draw a square circle.
The con sid er ations men tioned above are rel e vant here because I as sume that if nec es sary con di tions of a con cept -or its es sence-don't sat isfy the golden stan dard re quirements, that con cept can be con sid ered as a pseudo-problem.
Sim i larly, I want to raise a ques tion as to whether or not the con cept of law is an in stance of the kind of con cepts that sat isfy the golden stan dard, and there fore whether or not the goal of find ing the es sence of the con cept of law can be achieved. An a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence is con cerned with ex plain ing the na ture of law by at tempt ing to iso late and ex plain those features which make law into what it is. A suc cess ful the ory of law of this type is a the ory which con sists of prop o si tions about the law which (1) are nec es sar ily true, and (2) ad equately ex plain the na ture of law. 2
In my in ter pre ta tion, this means that an a lyt i cal ju ris prudence ap proaches the law by means of a con cept of the kind of CSGS, and there fore its pur pose is to pro vide that con cept.
IV. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS CONTENDERS a) The Plu ral ist
It seems to me that the above in ter pre ta tion about the goal of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence is chal lenged by the plu ral -43 THE GOLDEN STANDARD OF CONCEPTS ist. A plu ral is tic crit i cism is fre quently tended to show that the con cept of law fails in meet ing the fol low ing prop er ties of CSGS: 1) Con cep tual mo nism 2) Invariantism 3) Ex haus tive cov er age of the con cept
The strat egy against 1) and 2) is to pres ent coun ter-exam ples of dif fer ent con cepts of law, and against 3) to claim that the def i ni tion of law linked to the con cept of state is just one con cept of law among oth ers. Then, for plu ral ist crit ics -dif fer ent from CSGS-the prop er ties in volved in the def i ni tion of the con cept of law are: 1) Con cep tual plu ral ism (in op po si tion to con cep tual monism)
2) Con text de pend ence (in op po si tion to invariantism) 3) Non-ex haus tive epistemic cov er age
There fore this plu ral is tic view re jects "con cep tual im pe rial ism" that lies be hind an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, as well as the idea that the con cept of law is nec es sar ily linked to the con cept of state. In other terms: to the plu ral ist there is at least one x, which is a con cept of law, and is not linked to the con cept of state.
b) Self-Un der stand ing and Irresolvable Bound ary Dis putes
To my view, the the sis pre sented by phi los o phers such as Dan Priel is grounded in the prop er ties of con cep tual plural ism, contextualism and non ex haus tive cov er age in le gal the ory. I would call the the sis ar gued by these au thors as the "incommensurability the sis in le gal the ory".
Two im por tant com ments on Priel's claims need to be made: Firstly, he ac cepts con cep tual anal y sis as a valid method in ob tain ing di verse con cepts of law. That means that even if he is a con cep tual plu ral ist he might be con sid -ered as a meth od olog i cal mo nist. A sec ond point in this kind of skep ti cism, as op posed to the fifth prop erty of CSGS, consists in de ny ing the pos si bil ity of a pri ori con cepts of law.
V. THE REPLIES a) A Re sponse to the The sis of the Non-Ex haus tive Cov er age of An a lyt i cal Ju ris pru dence
In re sponse to the non-ex haus tive cov er age of an a lyt i cal le gal the o ries and con cep tual im pe ri al ism, Mi chael Giudice af firms:
An a lyt i cal le gal the o rists can scarcely be faulted for in correctly ex plain ing non-state forms of law when they have explic itly lim ited their the o ries to law in its state form. The prob lem is one of over sight or ig no rance, not mis take. 3 I think this is prob a bly not the best pos si ble coun ter-argu ment against Tamanaha, given that the goal of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence -as Julie Dick son ar gues-is not the concept of state law, but the na ture of law in gen eral.
b) A Re sponse to the Critic against Nec es sary Fea tures of Con cepts of Law and the Es sen tial Prop er ties of Law
I found this part of the pa per very in ter est ing be cause the al leged op po si tion be tween an a lyt i cal le gal phi los o phers and their (plu ral ist) con tend ers seems to dis ap pear.
Ac cord ing to Giudice, Jo seph Raz, who is one of the most im por tant ad vo cates of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence, ex plic itly sub scribes some of the the ses put for ward by his op ponents: 45 THE GOLDEN STANDARD OF CONCEPTS 1) Con cep tual plu ral ism, in terms of Raz (quoted by Giudice):
There is no uniquely cor rect ex pla na tion of a con cept, nothing which could qual ify as the ex pla na tion of the con cept of law. There can be a large num ber of cor rect al ter na tive expla na tions of a con cept… 4 2) Contextualism: Not all will be equally ap pro pri ate for all oc ca sions. Ap pro pri ate ness is a mat ter of rel e vance to the in ter ests of the ex pected or in tended pub lic, ap pro priate ness to the ques tions which trou ble it, to the puz zles which con fuse it… The rel a tiv ity of good ex pla na tions to the in ter ests and the ca pac i ties of their pub lic make them ephem eral and this ex plains why philosophy has a neverend ing task 3) Not-a pri ori na ture of con cepts "A cen tral aim of phi los o phy of law -Giudice con tin ues his ex pla na tion of Raz-[…] is to of fer ex pla na tions of the gen eral con cepts of law (and the con cept of law it self) which are re spon sive to both cit i zens' and the o rists' in ter ests in a way which il lu mi nates their self-un der stand ing". 5 By in ference we can as sume that Raz holds the the sis of the defeasibility of le gal the o ries in op po si tion to the un-defeasibility of CSGS. There is noth ing in Raz's thoughts about the incommensurability the sis.
Un til now it seems to me that there are some im por tant con clu sions that should be high lighted. Against the in terpre ta tion of the goal of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence as pro viding THE con cept of Law which must sat isfy the golden standard, Raz and the con tend ers agree on the im pos si bil ity of achiev ing this goal. Both hold at least con cep tual plu ral ism in op po si tion to con cep tual mo nism, contextualism in op -po si tion to invariantism, not ex haus tive cov er age of any legal the ory, and not a pri ori na ture of the con cepts of law.
On the other hand, con tend ers hold the the sis that concep tual anal y sis plays a very im por tant role in the anal y sis of so cial prac tices and di verse con cepts of Law.
But the agree ment is only ap par ent. In Giudice's words:
...re spon sive ness to con tin gent prac tices and shift ing in terests might sug gest that Raz's view is in ca pa ble of of fer ing what a the ory of law should: an ex pla na tion of law's uni versal and es sen tial prop er ties. But here ap pear ances of hav ing aban doned le gal the ory's goal are de ceiv ing, and show a further way in which Raz's view of the meth od ol ogy of le gal theory is nuanced. The fact that ex pla na tions of the con cept of law are ex pla na tions in ser vice of par tic u lar in quir ers' in terests does not pre clude hold ing at the same time that law has uni ver sal or es sen tial prop er ties. 6
In or der to un der stand this com plex view we need to observe a dis tinc tion drawn by Raz be tween the na ture of law and the con cept of law (a dis tinc tion that ear lier the o rists, in clud ing Hart, failed to no tice). The na ture of law is a meta phys i cal ob ject:
The ap pro pri ate ness, apt ness, or suc cess of ex pla na tions pre sup poses their truth… It is im por tant to em pha size that there is noth ing in the rel a tiv ity of good ex pla na tions to their pub lic to threaten the non rel a tiv ity of their truth. 7 Hence, Giudice claims:
The na ture of law is to be a meta phys i cal ob ject hav ing univer sal and es sen tial prop er ties, while the con cept of law is a pa ro chial, typ i cally pre vail ing un der stand ing of law's nature. 8 Here I can only ask how Giudice jus ti fies his claim that "what a the ory of law should" is an ex pla na tion of uni ver sal and es sen tial prop er ties of law, de spite the dif fi cul ties this kind of goal in volves. Re gard ing Raz' thoughts I can not under stand what would be the epistemic ad van tages of in troduc ing a meta phys i cal en tity in which truth need to be "assumed". This en tity is not a prod uct of ra tio nal ity, but dog matic ac cep tance. Or in Giudice's words some thing that "is in ac ces si ble to us".
Is it pos si ble to base the pro gram of an a lyt i cal ju ris prudence on some thing with out epistemic sup port?
In a dif fer ent part of his pa per, Giudice claims that:
It is im por tant to note that by this dis tinc tion Raz does not aim to ar gue that law re ally does have uni ver sal and es sential prop er ties -only that those com mit ted to sup pos ing that there is such a thing as the na ture of law are com mit ted to view ing law as hav ing uni ver sal and es sen tial prop er ties. 9
Ac cord ing to this quo ta tion, it seems that the as sump tion of the na ture of Law is that it has a reg u la tory ideal. But even in this case the in tro duc tion of meta phys i cal en ti ties is un nec es sary be cause it could be enough to af firm that the goal of ju ris pru dence is to pro vide con cepts of Law with the most pos si ble epistemic cov er age con sid er ing the proposal of other le gal the o ries. This strat egy could be con sistent with the re fusal of con cep tual mo nism. It is as if Raz said: «Ok, I agree with con cep tual plu ral ism, but I need to save the con cep tual im pe ri al ism of an a lyt i cal ju ris pru dence by in vent ing that there is a kind of meta phys i cal mo nism with out epistemic jus ti fi ca tion that must ori ent the ad mitted con cep tual plu ral ism in an a lyt i cal phi los o phy».
Prob a bly ear lier the o rists, in clud ing Hart, failed to no tice the dis tinc tion be tween con cepts and a sup posed na ture of Law. Prob a bly they did not think about this be cause they would have con sid ered it to be ir ra tio nal.
VI. ABOUT THE NATURALIZATION OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

Leiter's Considerations regarding the Golden Standard on the Denial of the a priori Thesis
Ac cord ing to Brian Leiter, who fol lows Quine, there are no an a lyt i cal or nec es sary truths, and there fore if the goal of con cep tual anal y sis is to pro vide nec es sary true con ditions for the con cept of Law, it is con demned to fail ure.
I strongly agree with Giudice when he af firms that there is much more to be nat u ral ized than the prob lems of ad judi ca tion. For in stance, our ex pla na tions about the way in which peo ple or ga nize and share con cepts, and schol ars con struct the o ries (and then, le gal con cepts and le gal the ories) could be nat u ral ized in con ti nu ity with the re sults provided by con tem po rary cog ni tive sci ences.
As for the re la tion be tween le gal the ory and the em pir i cal world, con cep tual le gal the o ries can be con sid ered as the ini tial con cep tual con structs which char ac ter izes the be ginning of ev ery em pir i cal re search. For in stance the statement that of fi cials iden tify the rules of a sys tem be cause they ac cept the same rule of rec og ni tion could be re de fined in em pir i cal terms as: is it true that of fi cials share that belief? Is it true that their cog ni tive pro cesses are only rec ogniz ing or oth er wise con struct ing norms from di verse ma terial which in volve more than what has been pro duced by le gal in sti tu tions? What could be the vari ables, and methods to mea sure the re sponses? This is not the place to ex tend my con sid er ations about the kind of re search in which I am cur rently work ing on (which I pro pose to call "Le gal Constructivism") but I can say that my tar get is to study le gal and the o ret i cal problems ac cord ing to the re sults of cog ni tive sci ences. From this ap proach there are good rea sons to sup port the the sis de fended by the con tend ers about con cep tual plu ral ism, since the con struc tion of con cepts, as a part of so cial rep resen ta tions, emerge from self-or ga niz ing pro cesses of so cial interactivity which ex plains the plu ral ity of con cep tions about the Law. But the same phe nom ena oc cur with the oret i cal con cepts which are the prod uct of a so cial epis te mology that emerge at the in te rior of sci en tific or philo soph i cal com mu ni ties. When these cog ni tive pro cesses achieve a sta ble state then a con cept has emerged.
I agree with Giudice and Hart about the un der de vel oped sit u a tion of so cial and psy cho log i cal sci ences in the 60's. But things have changed and now a days it is not nec es sary to re turn to the epistemic hab its com mon be fore Thales of Miletus, and nei ther is it nec es sary to ex plain the world in terms of meta phys i cal en ti ties as in the Razian idea of the "na ture of law".
